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IMRE LAKATOS, Proofs and Refutations, Edited by JOHN WORRAL AND ELIE 
ZAHAR. Cambridge University Press, 1976, 174 pp. 
This book is the most interesting work on the philosophy of mathematics to 
appear in many decades. It is not a technical contribution to the esoteric specialty 
called “foundations.” Rather, it is a genuinely philosophical attack on the 
central question: What is the nature of mathematical knowledge ? Every page is 
learned, witty, provocative, and controversial. 
The introduction is a brilliant, slashing attack on dogmatic and formalist 
philosophies. The main text is a dialogue between an imaginary teacher and his 
students. The theme of the classroom dialogue, echoed and enriched in the 
historical footnotes, is the formula 
V-E+F=2 
(Euler’s formula for the number of vertices V, edges E, and faces F of a poly- 
hedron). The footnotes are a historical counterpoint-a richly detailed and 
amazingly complex history of the Euler formula, starting not with Euler but 
with Descartes, and going on through Legendre, Cauchy, Crelle, Poinsot, 
L’Huilier, Gergonne, Mobius, Steinitz, and PoincarC. 
The dialogue starts with a proof presented by the teacher. This is the tradi- 
tional intuitive proof of Cauchy, in which the polyhedron is stretched on a plane, 
triangulated, and then simplified step by step. This is immediately followed by 
a whole menagerie of counterexamples, presented by the students. The debate 
is then, what did the proof prove I What do we “know” in mathematics I 
As the controversy goes on, the theme is elaborated and developed: Mathe- 
matics is not a dogma sanctified by formal logic. It is a never-ending process, in 
which concepts are invented and their properties explored by a simultaneous 
search for proofs and refutations. The argument progresses from one surprise 
to another. The stud&its argue with the teacher and with each other; each 
represents a distinct attitude toward mathematical truth. With frequent reversals 
of direction, new layers of ambiguity are revealed with each new clarification. 
The reader feels he is watching a magician who can always pull one more rabbit 
out of his sleeve. 
Dialogues on mathematics have been written also by Renyi, by Galileo, and 
by Plato. Lakatos does not suffer by comparison. 
On the explicit level, the goal of the discussion is a methodological analysis, 
a “logic of heuristic” to schematize the way mathematical knowledge advances 
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by criticism and countercriticism, proof and disproof. Beneath this surface, 
there is implicit a philosophical viewpoint that incorporates mathematics into 
the framework of Karl Popper’s critical philosophy, offering a new alternative 
to the dogmatic epistemology of all the “foundationist” schools (logicist, 
formalist, intuitionist). Instead of seeking to justify the assumed or demanded 
“absolute certainty” of true mathematical knowledge, Lakatos incorporates 
mathematics into a fallibilist philosophy of science. In mathematics as in natural 
science, knowledge progresses by criticism and countercriticism, and there is 
never a “final solution” that is “indubitable.” 
Implicit are new and fruitful answers to the basic questions: What is the 
content of mathematical statements? In what sense is mathematics knowledge 
about something? How do we attain it, and why do we believe in it? 
“Proofs and Refutations” was first published in 1963, as a series of four 
articles in the British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science. It was based on the 
first chapter of Lakatos’ thesis, submitted at Cambridge in 1961 under the 
supervision of R. B. Braithwaite. As Lakatos wrote at that time, “The paper 
should be seen against the background of Polya’s revival of mathematical 
heuristic, and of Popper’s critical philosophy.” 
Some facts about Lakatos’ life may help the reader to appreciate Lakatos’ 
thinking. He was a survivor of the Nazi occupation of Hungary, a resistance 
fighter whose mother and grandmother perished at Auschwitz. In 1947, at the 
age of 25, he was virtually in charge of the reform of higher education in Hungary. 
Although an unwavering communist, he was arrested in 1950 and imprisoned 
until 1952. In 1954 Renyi used his influence to get him a job as a translator of 
mathematical books. One of the works he translated was Polya’s “How to 
Solve It.” At this time he became acquainted with the writings of Karl Popper 
as well. His communist certainties began to dissolve. After the Hungarian 
uprising of 1957, he fled to Vienna, and from there to England, where he met 
Polya and Popper. Polya suggested the history of the “Descartes-Euler con- 
jecture” for his doctorate. In 1960 Lakatos joined Popper on the faculty of the 
London School of Economics. In February 1974, he died suddenly, at the age 
of 51. Except for a few brief fragments, he had published nothing more on 
mathematics. His work on the philosophy of science is well known, and he was 
editor of the B. J.P.S. at his death. 
“Proofs and Refutations” marks a brilliant beginning. No doubt Lakatos 
hoped to return to this subject, to carry through the task laid out there. To make 
his views on the epistemology and ontology of mathematics explicit would 
mean, among many other things, spelling out the nature of informal mathematics 
and its relationship to formalized mathematics, to natural science, and to the 
physical world. Lakatos died leaving this task undone. It remains as a gigantic 
challenge for the present and future. 
In preparing this book for posthumous publication, Worrall and Zahar have 
added valuable new material from Chapters 2 and 3 of Lakatos’ thesis, dealing 
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with Poincare’s proof of the Euler conjecture, with the history of the concept 
of uniform continuity, and with the implications of Lakatos’ philosophical ideas 
for the teaching and exposition of mathematics. I suspect that much remains 
in Lakatos’ unpublished manuscripts that would be of great interest and value 
to many readers. 
It is a pity that Worral and Zahar felt it necessary to defend, in a sometimes 
gratuitous and embarrassing way, the dogmatic claims of formal logic against 
the skepticism of Lakatos. Everything is fallible, it seems, except formal logic. 
(“There is no serious sense in which such proofs are fallible,” we read in a 
footnote by the editors on page 57.) 
Worrall and Zahar would have done better to restrict their disagreements to 
the Preface. Their footnotes and starred additions are jarring and inappropriate. 
Still, there is no question that in making “Proofs and Refutations” available 
at last in book form, they have rendered a great service to the mathematical 
community. It should be read by every student and practitioner of mathematics 
who has some curiosity to known what he is doing and why. For this, our hearty 
thanks to Professors Worrall and Zahar, to the Syndics of the Cambridge 
University Press, and to Lakatos’ last research assistant, Gregory Currie. 
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